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Relates inflationary pressures on
wages and prices to the implications
of these for economic stabilization
purposes.
Before one can assess the efficacy
of current wage and price controls, it is
necessary to examine the nature of the
present inflationary forces. This paper
looks first at general economic condi-
tions and then focuses on inflation from
the wage side (cost push) followed by an
analysis of recent behavior on the price
side. Attention is then turned to the
causes of the recent surge-in of prices
and the implications of these for
economic stabilization purposes.
The most notable feature of the
economy in the first half of 1973 was
the strong economic up-turn. Employment
increased by almost three million persons
during the past year with unemployment
moving down to 4.5 percent. Although
this latter figure is still high when
judged against a four percent “full
employment” target, it is much less un-
acceptable when viewed against a back-
drop of huge increases in the labor
force over the past year. In addition,
the “spread” between employment rates
and various categories is wide, thereby
indicating particularly tight labor
supply conditions in some occupations
and sectors.
Capacity utilization measures point
to even greater tightness in product
markets than in labor markets. During
the first half of 1973, capacity utiliza-
tion stood at around 90 percent versus
approximately 70 percent in August, 1971,
when the first price freeze was imposed.
Also, the spread among different sectors
in utilization rates is greater than
during comparable periods in the past
with some sectors such as autos, steel,
rubber, paper, afidoil refining dis-
playing extremely high capacity utiliza-
tion rates. All of this is reflected in
very high production levels coupled with
an extremely rapid growth in real GNP
during the first half of 1973. The
economy, then, is in the midst of a
strong boom although many economists have
dubbed this one of the unhappiest booms
in recent history.
The inflationary pressures in the
first half of 1973 are strikingly dif-
ferent from those which existed in 1971
when the New Economic Policy was imple-
mented. At that time the inflation was
rightly considered to be a wage-push
problem while the current inflation is
almost entirely devoid of cost-push
characteristics from the labor side.
Major (first year) collective bargaining
settlements in 1971 (contracts covering
over 5,000 workers) averaged 12.4 percent;
the comparable figure for the first nine
months of 1973 was 7.6 percent (and 8.5
percent for 1972). Average hourly earn-
ings increases have similarly moved down,
albeit not so dramatically, from 7.1 per-
cent in 1971 to 6.3 percent during the
first half of 1973.
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has subsided substantially from what it
was when the President first imposed
wage-price controls in the autumn of
1971. It would, however, be a mistake
to believe that we are out of the woods
on the wage side. Two factors are impor-
tant in assessing the degree of infla-
tionary pressures from the wage side:
(1) the increase in hourly earnings, i.e.
wages; and (2) the level of productivity
improvements . Both of these factors
have been behaving favorably from an
anti-inflationary standpoint during the
first half of 1973. However, this be-
havior is not likely to continue during
the latter part of 1973 and into 1974.
Both variables are likely to become less
favorable: hourly earnings can be
expected to increase as a result of con-
tinuing pressures from Cost of Living
increases and productivity improvements
can be expected to decline. This latter
factor is especially important as the
economy approaches full capacity utiliza-
tion and full employment of its labor
resources. As full capacity is reached,
unit costs will no longer recede because
of declines in fixed costs. At the same
time, less efficient labor resources
must be utilized, thereby increasing
per unit labor costs. Given the likeli-
hood of both of these factors, let us
examine a possible scenario. If hourly
earnings move up by only one to one and
one-half percent-- a very likely occur-
rence--they will be in the neighborhood
of 7.5 percent. At the same time, it is
quite likely that productivity improve-
ments will recede to the two to two and
one-half percent neighborhood. The
result of this would be an inflationary
bias from labor cost side of five to
five and one-half percent. That is,
because of labor cost pressures alone,
prices would move upward at an annual
rate of five to five and one-half per-
cent, far from a national goal of two
and one-half to three percent. This, of
course, is a level of inflation above
what most persons consider tolerable and
would take place even in the absence of
any price pressures on the product market
side. Unfortunately, it is highly un-
likely that such price pressures from the
product side will be anywhere near the
zero level. ‘
The quiescent behavior on the wage
side , while unexpected by most observers,
has been even more remarkable when one
compares hourly earnings with price move-
ments . During the past year real spend-
able earnings--which take into account
the length of the work week, the amount
of earnings, the increase in prices, and
taxes for a family of four--have actually
gone down by 0.6 percent. This is an
ominous sign. It means, among other
things, that while corporate profits
have increased at a record pace and the
economy is in the midst of a boom, workers
are, in fact, worse off than they were a
year ago. Since real gross national
product is moving up at a very rapid rate,
this means that there is a sizable re-
distribution of income occurring which is
taking earnings from the wage side and
transplanting them into corporate profits.
Of course, some redistribution in this
direction is expected during an upswing;
however, the absolute decline in real
income for a working family of four is
distressing.
Prices
While it is true that the outlook
is none too bright on the wage side, the
real inflationary impact during 1973 has
come from the price side. Price move-
ments during the first six months of the
year display a remarkable surge, which
was unforeseen by almost all observers.
Looking first at the consumer price index,
all items have moved up by 7.4 percent
(first half of 1973, seasonally adjusted
annual rate). All items with the ex-
clusion of food moved up at an annual J
rate of 4.6 percent while food moved up
at an annual rate of 17.8 percent. These
price movements are even more dramatic
when one views the wholesale price index,
Here all commodities moved up at an
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first half of 1973. Industrial prices
moved up at a somewhat slower, but still
high, rate of 10.9 percent while farm and
farm products jumped at an alarming 66.8
percent rate.
For analytical purposes, it is useful
to look at price increases by the stage
of production. Invariably, prices have
increased faster at the early stage of
production than at the consumer end.
Wholesale prices of crude materials (the
first stage of input) moved upward at an
annual rate of 17.7 percent during the
first six months of 1973. Wholesale
prices of intermediate goods (the next
stage of production) moved upward at a
rate of 8.3 percent, omitting food.
Wholesale prices of consumer finished
goods moved up at an annual rate of seven
percent while consumer prices less food
moved up at an annual rate of 4.6 per-
cent . Thus, we move from an increase of
17.7 percent on the input end to an in-
crease of 4.6 percent on the final con-
sumer output end. What this means is
that there is a good deal of pressure
left in the pipeline. Thus, even if
the upward surge in wholesale prices
moderates over the coming months, the
impact of this is not likely to be felt
at the consumer end for some time. In-
deed, consumer prices could well accel-
erate at a time of slackening wholesale
price increases.
These basic economic forces on the
wage and price side must, of necessity,
constitute the parameters in which any
public policy can operate. Before
moving to the policy alternatives, how-
ever, it will be useful to review and
explore some of the major reasons for
the remarkable surge during 1973.
Inflationary Forces
As usual, the explanations for the
current price increases can be found in
the interaction of supply and demand--
coupled with some large doses of policy
miscalculations and mistakes.
In the first instance, we are under
the influence of a very significant,
world-wide economic boom which means a
high world-wide demand for many products
and raw materials. This pressure is
severely felt in some basic industries
and commodities and is leading to very
severe cost pressures on the industrial
side. For example, the steel industry
is operating at extremely high capacity
utilization levels in this country as
well as throughout the Western World.
This has put an extraordinarily high
level of demand on inputs, including
ferrous scrap. The same is true of
copper, zinc, aluminum, and other basic
industries with the result being unpre-
cedented world-wide price pressure on
these commodities.
This world-wide demand has also led
to wide-spread capacity shortages in
these basic industries. Over the past
decade or so, there has been relative
over-capacity in most basic industries.
This has led to quite stable prices along
with relatively low profits. NOW, how-
ever, along with rising demand there are
rising costs resulting from new pollu-
tion control efforts, labor cost in-
creases, lack of quality ores, etc.,
which have led to a further squeeze on
profits. Therefore, there has been
little incentive for capacity expansion
in these industries. With demands now
at unprecedented levels, existing cap-
acity is simply not sufficient enough to
allow rapid increases in output. The
result is sharp increases in prices in
these areas.
Food prices have been subject to
similar international pressures. Bad
weather and resulting crop failures in
large areas of the world have led to
shortages in food supplies. The United
States has been one of the few countries
able to respond by increasing agricultural
exports. This, again, has led to severe
domestic price pressures on these vital
foodstuffs.
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especially for industrial conunodities,
is unprecedented. During most world
business cycles, the U.S. economy leads
the economies of other nations. While we
are on the upturn, they are still on the
downturn or in the trough. Then, when
the U.S. economy begins moving downward
other economies begin the upward movement.
This time, however-- most probably because
of greatly increased communication net-
works-- the business cycles of the major
western industrial nations have tended to
coincide. This, of course, exacerbated
the already severe domestic inflationary
pressures.
Combined with the world-wide expan-
sion has been the effect of the recent
devaluations in the dollar. Formal de-
valuations beginningin August of 1971, and
again January of 1973, combined with an
unofficial devaluation resulting from
floating exchange rates, have had two
sharp domestic effects: (1) an increase
in the price of imports which is directly
reflected in the domestic consumer price
index, and (2) more attractive exports
which have furthered the shortages of
U.S. commodities already in short supply.
Examples here include copper, steel
scrap, copper scrap, aluminum, lumber,
pulp, and food. This had, among other
things, led to a rising demand for export
controls which the Administration has
wisely resisted.
Finally, in response to the above
pressures, there has been widespread
speculation in several basic commodities,
including copper, cotton, and even soy-
beans. Because of world-wide doubt con-
cerning the value of the dollar, persons
holding large amounts of these commodities
have felt increasingly uneasy and have
attempted to get rid of their dollars by
buying basic commodities. This, in turn,
has led to even more world-wide and
domestic price pressures.
The Impact of Public Policy
Nor can Administration policies be
completely excused from the present in-
flationary situation. First of all>
there was the infamous Russian wheat
deal. While the Administration is cor-
rect in asserting that it did not directly
sell the wheat to the Soviet Union, it
did approve of the sales and, in fact,
did underwrite them with loan guarantees.
The point here is not that the export of
American agricultural products is bad;
quite the opposite is the case. However,
severe domestic price fluctuations should
not be the price of increased exports.
The export of American agricultural p~od-
ucts could be carried on in a more
orderly and systematic fashion so as to
preclude the violent gyrations on the
price American consumers are forced to
pay. Furthermore, the huge sale of
Russian wheat--which amounted to nearly
two-thirds of one year’s domestic prod-
uction--had unforeseen consequences.
It meant, among other things, a virtual
tie up of railroad cars in an attempt to
get the wheat to the ports. This led to
rail car shortages in critical areas
such as pulp, paper products> and steel
scrap which further increased the price
pressures in these seemingly unrelated
areas.
In another related matter, Admin-
istration policy is even less susceptible
to favorable interpretation. The dimen-
sions of the Russian wheat deal were
well known as early as August, 1972.
However, it was not until January of
1973, that the Administration belatedly
released 50 million acres of idle agri-
cultural land for increased production.
While this was a laudable move, it was,
of course, too late to affect the winter
wheat crop of 1972 and so led to even
greater shortages in 1973. Perhaps
political desires for high farm prices
by election day overrode anti-inflation-
ary considerations for lower consumer
February 74/page 108 Journal of Food Distribution Researchprices. In any case, the result was as
predictable as it was dramatic: Farm
prices shot upward at an unprecedented
rate.
During this same period--in parti-
cular, January of 1973-- the Administra-
tion scrapped its fairly effective Phase
II price and wage controls in return for
a “self-administeredf~ or l%oluntarytt
Phase III. The results were disastrous.
Prices moved upward at a rate much
faster than could be termed simply pent-
up prices from earlier months. A large
reason for this is that it was clear
that inflationary pressures had not sub-
sided. Businessmen as well as most
other persons assumed that the govern-
ment would again have to take strong
anti-inflationary actions. The result
was a series of anticipatory price in-
creases in the hopes of each individual
firm not being caught “with its prices
downr’in the event of another price
freeze. This, of course, is precisely
what happened as the anticipatory price
increases of Phase III coincided with the
remarkable surge in international prices.
The above considerations would, of
course, have been enough to produce a
considerable inflation by themselves.
However, the administration also coupled
these forces with a tremendous amount of
pre-election spending in the early parts
of 1972. This hurry-up spending, under-
taken in an effort to speedily pull the
economy up out of its planned recession
of 1971, further fueled the already
raging fires of inflation.
As a result of all of these above
pressures, we are now in Phase IV of the
Administration’s “New Economic Policy”
with only the most optimistic observers
assessing the inunediate future as bright.
The Available Options
What, then are the policy choices?
Basically, we face three possible alter-
natives. First, we could ‘flet ‘er got’.
The administration could abandon its
already unpopular wage and price control
mechanism and return to the more con-
ventional tools of fiscal and monetary
policy. There are two major difficulties
with this policy. First it is very
dangerous. Inflation is an extremely
serious problem not only from the per-
spective of the business community, but,
more importantly, from the perspective
of the consumer. Rampant inflation leads
inexorably to social instability which
in turn can induce a weary populace to
accept almost any alternative. The
political and social implications of
this course of action are ominous at
best. Second, such a policy would in-
evitably lead to a serious outbreak of
wage-push inflation next year as labor
unions along with everyone else fought to
regain their lost purchasing power. Thus ,
there would be little likelihood of the
inflation “burning itself out”.
A second course of action would be
another planned recession such as that
of 1971 in order to squelch the infla-
tionary fires. Again, there are two
major objections to such a policy: First,
such a policy is very expensive. At the
present time, every one percent increase
in unemployment leads to over 800,000
persons being thrown out of work. The
difference, then, between 4 percent and 6
percent unemployment implies approximately
1,600,000 additional persons on the un-
employment roles. At the same time,
given the current level of gross national
product, every one percent of unemploy-
ment implies approximately $35 billion
in foregone output. The output dif-
ference between a four percent and six
percent unemployment rate is around $70
billion of which approximately $24 billion
would be federal, state, and local tax
revenues. At the very least, then, one
advocating a recessionary policy should
be extremely well aware of the costly
consequences .
These consequences would perhaps be
more palatable should the outcome on the
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fortunately, it is not. There is no
assurance whatsoever that plunging the
economy into another recession would
diminish significantly the inflationary
pressures. Indeed, given the costs
already in the pipeline along with the
experience of 1970 to 1971, it is
extremely unlikely that this would be
the case. Therefore, the economy may
be forced to incur the costs of reces-
sion without reaping any.of its supposed
benefits.
A third alternative is Phase IV.
This, in essence, means trying to keep
the lid on prices and wages, and, while
cooling the economy somewhat, relying
upon wage and price controls to help
keep smooth the transition to a sustain-
able economic growth rate. This is a
reasonable policy alternative. In fact,
given the likely scenarios of the other
alternatives, it is almost attractive.
Unfortunately, given the Administration’s
extreme distaste for direct intervention
in the market place, the likelihood of
this policy being effective is question-
able at best.
In addition, at the very time that
the task of wage and price controls is
becoming more complex, consumer bus-
iness and labor opposition is becoming
more vocal. In part, this is true
because controls are now pinching more
than before. In part, however, it is
true because the Administration repeat-
edly makes its own disdain for such
policies so obvious. In addition,
controls have, of late, been asked to do
many things that most economists would
say they could not accomplish even under
the best of circumstances. The most ob-
vious example is the placing of the most
stringent controls over the most com-
petitive sector of the economy; namely
agriculture.
What, then, is the outlook? In my
judgment, the food industry, which is
under quite tight price controls at this
time, will continue to be so in the fore-
seeable future. This is not because
price controls intrinsicly make more
sense in this industry; indeed, they make
little sense. Nor is it because the
“middlemen” have been “greedy” and
deserve to be punished accordingly. In-
stead, the problem is almost entirely
political. The price movement in this
industry, which has been the result of
(foreseeable) supply and demand forces,
have produced extremely severe political
pressures to ‘tdosomething”. As a result,
until the distortions become even more
pronounced than they are now, this pres-
sure will probably continue to dictate
public policy.
At the same time, the increased
supplies of agricultural products that
almost surely will come about next year
will greatly reduce the pressures, both
political and economic, for continued
controls. As this happens, it can be
expected that the Administration’s econ-
omists--who dislike controls in any case--
will move swiftly to remove them from the
competitive sectors of the economy.
In the long run, it is unlikely that
this or any other Administration will
again be able to completely give up any
responsibility over wage and price
decisions in the industrial economy. At
the same time, it can be hoped that efforts
in this area will be increasingly turned
toward those areas of the economy where
controls can do some good. This does not
include, at this time, the food distri-
bution sectors of the economy.
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